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Empirical  evidence  suggests  that  the  European  unemployment  problem  is  somehow 
connected  with  a  capital  shortage.  The  paper  introduces  a  Keynesian  model  to  deal 
with  this  issue.  In  this  model  the  rate  of  capacity  utilization  plays  a  central  role  in 
two  simultaneously  operating  mechanisms  thus  exhibiting  hysteresis:  price  adjust- 
ment  and  capital  accumulation.  The  implications  for  employment  and  unemploy- 
ment  are  discussed.  It  is  demonstrated  that  equilibrium  unemployment  may  be 
caused  by  adverse  demand  shocks. 
1.  Introduction 
In  the  discussions  on  long-term  unemployment  in  Europe,  the 
possibility  of  a  capital  shortage  has  been  mentioned  regularly.  The 
main  idea  is  that  insufficient  capital  accumulation  creates  a situation 
in  which  not  enough  jobs  are  available  for  the  existing  working  force. 
Quite  often  also  the  existence  of  a  capital  shortage  is  rejected.  Dif- 
ferent  arguments  are  presented  to  substantiate  this  claim.  For  in- 
stance,  Layard  and  Bean  (1988)  argue  that  the  number  of  workers 
per  machine  can  be  varied  on  any  shift  and  that  the  number  of 
shifts  can  be  varied,  too.  Under  these  circumstances  there  can  be 
no  capital  constraint.  What  really  matters  then  are  supply  con- 
straints  originating  in  the  labor  market.  In  Layard  and  Nickel1  (1986), 
Nickel1  (1987),  and  other  publications  by  the  same  authors,  this  ar- 
gument  is  elaborated  upon.  It  is  assumed  that  capital  accumulation 
or  decumulation  has  no  effect  on  (equilibrium)  unemployment  be- 
cause  changes  in  productivity  are  fully  reflected  in  changes  in  real 
wages.  In  our  view  this  argument  may  hold  in  a  structural  sense. 
Otherwise,  unemployment  would  steadily  rise  or  decline,  which  is 
clearly  unrealistic.  Nevertheless,  deviations  from  the  trend  growth 
rate  could  have  a lasting  impact  on  unemployment  if  real  wages  are 
rigid  to  some  extent. 
*We  are  indebted  to  F.  van  der  Ploeg  as  well  as  to  two  anonymous  referees  of 
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The  consequences  of  a reduction  in  the  capital  stock  on  impact 
of  adverse  demand  and  supply  shocks  therefore  deserve  proper  at- 
tention  It  should  be  noted  that  the  problem  has  been  analyzed  to 
some  extent  in  a neoclassical  setting  (for  example,  Bruno  and  Sachs 
1985;  Van  der  Ploeg  1987;  Burda  1988).  In  the  neoclassical  model 
structural  unemployment  is explained  as a  result  of  the  controversy 
between  employers  and  employees  within  an  equilibrium  context; 
product  markets  clear  as a result  of  flexible  prices.  Therefore,  struc- 
tural  or  equilibrium  unemployment  is  caused  by  push  factors  such 
as union  militancy,  mismatch  on  labor  markets,  the  wedge  between 
real  consumers’  and  real  producers’  wages,  etc.  Actual  unemploy- 
ment  may  deviate  from  equilibrium  unemployment  in  the  short  run 
because  of  nominal  wage  or  price  inertia.  Nominal  inertia  is  then 
modeled  in  a  complementary  way  by  assuming  that  price  or  wage 
expectations  of  economic  agents  may  deviate  temporarily  from  their 
actual  values.  Production  and  investment  decisions  are  still  based 
on  price  signals.  Therefore,  once  price  expectations  catch  up  with 
actual  prices,  the  neoclassical  equilibrium  structure  is  again  fully 
applicable. 
In  a  recent  and  useful  review  of  economic  theory  behind  the 
papers  at  the  Chelwood  Gate  conferences  on  unemployment  in  Eu- 
rope,  Blanchard  (1988)  criticizes  what  he  calls  the  false  dichotomy 
between  equilibrium  and  actual  unemployment.  The  main  reason 
for  this  is  that  the  neoclassical  theory,  at  least  in  Chelwood  Gate 
Mark  I,  does  not  fit  the  actual  experience  in  Europe  in  the  1980s.’ 
During  that  period  negative  aggregate  demand  shocks  induced  an 
increase  in  actual  unemployment  followed  by  a  rise  in  equilibrium 
unemployment.  According  to  Blanchard,  Chelwood  Gate  Mark  II 
explores  two  channels  which  may  explain  that  high  actual  unem- 
ployment  induces  a  high  level  of  equilibrium  unemployment  and 
which  were  already  suggested  at  the  first  conference.  The  first 
channel  is  capital  accumulation.  A  sustained  period  of  unemploy- 
ment  may  lead  to  capital  decumulation  and  therefore  to  an  in- 
creased  equilibrium  unemployment  level.  The  second  channel  re- 
lates  to  different  aspects  of  hysteresis  on  the  labor  market,  implying 
that  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  depends  upon  the  actual  rate 
(for  example,  Sachs  1987). 
We  agree  with  Blanchard’s  critique  on  the  dichotomy  between 
actual  and  equilibrium  unemployment.  However,  where  Blanchard 
‘Proceedings  of  the  first  conference  on  unemployment  at  Chelwood  Gate,  Sus- 
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still  analyzes  the  role  of  capital  accumulation  within  a  neoclassical 
model  we  depart  from  this  view  of  the  world.  In  our  opinion,  the 
ultimate  consequence  of  the  dichotomy  critique  should  be  that  be- 
havior  of  producers  is modeled  differently  from  the  neoclassical  par- 
adigm.  For  instance,  if  firms  are  confronted  with  a  lack  of  effective 
demand,  this  should  influence  their  investments  decisions  or  more 
generally,  it  may  even  endanger  the  very  existence  of  the  firm. 
Blanchard  (1988)  suggests  that  the  introduction  of  monopolistic 
competition  into  the  neoclassical  model  takes  care  of  the  demand 
problem.  This  is  not  the  route  we  want  to  follow.  Monopolistic 
competition  does  not  change  the  neoclassical  model  in  an  essential 
way.  On  the  contrary,  the  formal  results  are  the  same,  except  for 
a  multiplicative  factor  determining  the  monopoly  profit  of  the  firm. 
The  stories  told  sound  different,  of  course,  because  firms  are  en- 
gaged  in  active  price  setting,  whereas  under  perfect  competition, 
firms  are  price  takers.  But  here  again  the  difference  is  only  super- 
ficial.  Under  perfect  competition  someone  has  to  set  prices,  and  the 
dynamic  evolution  to  a  state  of  rest  mirrors  theories  of  imperfect 
competition,  as Arrow  (1959)  pointed  out  long  ago. 
To  cope  with  the  issue  of  demand  shocks  and  capital  decu- 
mulation  we  present  a  model  which  is  more  Keynesian  in  spirit.  It 
is  assumed  that  price  adjustment  is  sluggish.  The  reasons  for  price 
inertia  are  not  spelled  out.  Small  menu  cost  (for  example,  Blan- 
chard  and  Kiyotaki  1987;  Ball  and  Romer  1987)  may  be  a  cause, 
but  we  would  prefer  microeconomic  theories  focusing  on  informa- 
tional  aspects  (for  example,  Stiglitz  1984;  Van  de  Klundert  and  Pe- 
ters  1988).  In  an  economywide  recession,  firms  may  increase  sales 
by  lowering  the  price  of  output,  but  they  may  be  highly  uncertain 
whether  this  would  entail  a  rise  in  revenue  as competitors  may  lower 
their  prices,  too.  Under  these  circumstances  it  could  be  rational  for 
risk-averse  firms  to  stick  to  the  prevailing  price  level. 
In  our  model,  sluggish  price  adjustment  is associated  with  un- 
certainty  about  the  outcome  of  the  competitive  process  if  the  econ- 
omy  is hit  by  aggregative  shocks.  Firms  may  then  behave  rationally 
by  adjusting  quantities.  In  the  short  run  this  takes  the  form  of  a 
reduction  in  output  on  impact  of  an  adverse  demand  shock.  As  the 
recession  proceeds  there  will  be  an  increase  in  company  failures, 
and  some  large  firms  may  close  plants,  scrapping  capital  and  making 
workers  redundant.  Once  this  has  happened,  once  a factory  has  been 
demolished,  it  cannot  suddenly  begin  production  again  if  demand 
for  its  product  increases.  Hysteresis  connected  with  capital  decu- 
mulation  induces  a  decline  in  employment.  If  there  are  sufficient 
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substitution  possibilities  and  if  real  wages  are  flexible  enough,  full 
employment  could  of  course  be  attained  within  a  reasonable  time 
span.  Following  Blanchard  (1988)  there  is  an  obvious  loose  end  in 
the  argument  that  a  capital  shortage  leads  to  high  unemployment. 
We  agree  that  the  argument  is  not  complete.  In  addition,  some- 
thing  should  be  assumed  about  the  functioning  of  the  labor  market. 
Even  so,  it  may  be  important  to  give  a proper  analysis  of  the  “phys- 
ical  capital  story”  (Blanchard  and  Summers  1986).  We  think  our 
paper  may  shed  some  new  light  on  this  issue. 
Turning  to  the  stylized  facts,  it  could  be  maintained  that  dur- 
ing  the  protracted  recession  of  1980-1982,  demand-deficient  un- 
employment  developed  into  equilibrium  unemployment,  especially 
in  Europe.  Capacity  utilization  rates  reflect  the  impact  of  the  reces- 
sion.  For  instance  by  OECD,  it  is a well-documented  fact  that  after 
a  year  of  rapid  recovery  in  1983-1984  the  rates  of  capacity  utili- 
zation  in  manufacturing  in  European  countries  returned  to  normal 
levels,  and  thereafter  on  the  average  have  stayed  at  the  peak  level 
of  1979.  Thus,  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  potential  output  was 
adjusted  downward  to  actual  output. 
The  paper  proceeds  as follows.  Our  Keynesian  approach  to  the 
problem  of  capital  accumulation  and  unemployment  persistence  is 
introduced  in  Section  2.  In  Section  3  an  analytical  solution  of  the 
dynamic  system  emerging  out  of  the  Keynesian  model  is presented. 
The  system  has  one  zero  root,  reflecting  hysteresis,  and  two  neg- 
ative  roots,  which  stabilize  the  development  over  time.  The  long- 
run  solutions  give  rise  to  a number  of  interesting  observations.  The 
paper  closes  with  conclusions  and  suggestions  for  further  research. 
2.  A  Keynesian  Model 
The  central  assumption  of  our  Keynesian  type  of  model  is  that 
(nominal)  output  prices  and  (nominal)  wages  are  fixed  in  the  short 
run.  As  a consequence  it  becomes  necessary  to  distinguish  between 
demand  or  actual  output,  X,  and  potential  output  or  notional  sup- 
ply,  Y,  on  the  one  hand  and  between  actual  employment,  N,  and 
notional  labor  demand  or  the  availability  of  jobs,  L,  on  the  other 
hand,  although  these  concepts  are  given  a  somewhat  different  con- 
tent  than  in  the  standard  literature  on  rationing  (for  example,  Mal- 
invaud  1977;  Benassy  1982).  It  is  assumed  that  firms  expect  to  be 
in  a  situation  of  Keynesian  unemployment  most  of  the  time.  The 
possibility  of  repressed  inflation  is  not  excluded,  but  may  be  less 
relevant  as prices  adjust  fast  in  such  a  situation.  With  demand  con- 
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strained  in  this  way,  short-run  profit  maximization  is  not  an  issue, 
but  it  may  pay  to  produce  at  minimal  costs.  Suppose  that  the  pro- 
duction  function  relating  notional  output  to  notional  labor  demand 
and  capital,  K,  is  given  by 
Y =  EL”lF  )  O<h<l,  El-O.  (1) 
The  first-order  condition  for  a  cost  minimum  can  then  be  written 
as 
K  1-AW  -=-- 
L  A  R’ 
(2) 
where  W  stands  for  the  real  wage  rate,  and  R  denotes  the  real  user 
cost  of  capital.  The  latter  is  assumed  constant  throughout  the  anal- 
ysis.  It  should  be  stressed  that  cost  minimization,  according  to 
Equation  (2),  is  a  long-run  concern  of  firms.  Factor  substitution 
is  considered  for  a  situation  where  demand  equals  potential  output 
(X  =  Y).  In  such  an  equilibrium  situation,  firms  want  to  produce 
at  the  lowest  cost,  given  factor  remunerations.  Cost  minimization 
therefore  constitutes  an  element  of  strategic  behavior  in  the  ar- 
rangements  firms  have  to  make. 
For  commodity  demand  we  employ  a  simple  quantity  formula 
(compare  Blanchard  1988): 
A 
x=P’ 
where  the  parameter  A  is  codetermined  by  monetary  factors  (that 
is,  the  supply  of  money  and  the  velocity  of  circulation).  Total  ex- 
penditure  equals  consumption,  investment,  and  government  spend- 
ing:  X  =  C  +  Z  +  G.  Consumption  depends  on  income  and  real 
cash  balances:  C  =  C(X,  M/P).  Investment  is  explained  by  Equa- 
tion  (6)  below,  and  government  spending  is  exogenous.  Combining 
these  assumptions,  the  aggregate  demand  function  may  be  written 
like  that  in  Equation  (3).  To  simplify  further,  government  spending 
will  be  ignored  in  the  sequel  of  this  paper.  Aggregate  demand  may 
adjust  to  aggregate  supply  by  changes  in  the  price  level  (Pigou  ef- 
fect).  Because  interest  rates  are  fixed  there  is  no  Keynes  effect  in 
the  present  model. 
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As  capital  is given  in  the  short  run,  firms  will  produce  output 
(effective  demand)  with  the  minimal  amount  of  labor  necessary.  This 
gives  the  equation  for  actual  employment:2 
The  output  gap  is  closed  over  time  by  two  simultaneously  op- 
erating  mechanisms.  First,  it  is  assumed  along  traditional  lines  that 
prices  decrease  as  a  function  of  the  rate  of  capacity  utilization 
(Q  =  X/Y):” 
p = PC0  -  1)  >  p>o. 
Second,  we  assume  that  the  stock  of  capital  also  changes  with  the 
degree  of  capacity  utilization: 
k 
-  =  a(Q  -  1) ,  a>O. 
K 
(6) 
Such  an  investment  equation  may  seem  restrictive,  but  there  are 
indications  that  capital  decumulation  has  occurred  in  Europe  be- 
cause  of  underutilization  of  capital  due  to  a fall  in  aggregate  demand 
(for  example,  Hudson  1988). 
Substitution  of  Equations  (1)  and  (2)  into  Equation  (6),  taking 
account  of  the  definition  of  Q,  yields  the  Keynesian  investment 
function: 
The  real  user  cost  of  capital  is negatively  related  to  investment.  An 
increase  in  real  wages  pushes  capital  deepening.  In  the  Keynesian 
model  it  is  assumed  that  firms  make  their  investment  decision  con- 
ditioned  on  a  given  level  of  output.  The  theory  of  investment  has 
‘Equation  (4)  follows  from  ex  post  profit  maximization  supposing  that  (SX/SiV) 
t  W  (compare  Malinvaud  1989). 
3A  possible  effect  of  nominal  wage  changes  on  nominal  price  setting  is  not  taken 
into  account  because  we  ignore  the  leapfrogging  of  prices  over  wages  and  vice  versa. 
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to  fit  in  the  effective  demand  framework  (compare  Hall  and  Taylor 
1988).  In  the  neoclassical  theory  there  is no  demand  constraint,  and 
profitable  investment  projects  may  lead  to  an  expansion  in  output. 
From  a  neoclassical  perspective  the  present  Keynesian  model 
may  perhaps  seem  ad  hoc.  The  relevant  question,  however,  is 
whether  the  model  has  something  to  say  about  a  world  where  un- 
certainty  in  the  sense  of  risk  prevails;  information  may  be  asym- 
metrically  distributed,  and  competition  may  take  different  forms, 
which  calls  for  strategic  behavior.  If  this  is  indeed  the  real  world, 
a  model  like  the  present  one  may  be  useful  as  a  first  step  for  un- 
derstanding  such  a world.  This  does  not  imply  that  we  should  aban- 
don  the  rationality  postulate,  which  is  at  the  heart  of  our  science. 
But  the  assumption  of  representative  agents  with  full  information 
may  stretch  the  postulate  too  far.  Anyhow,  as  shown  by  Malinvaud 
(1980,  1989),  investment  functions  which  give  the  rate  of  capacity 
utilization  a  role  to  play  can  be  derived  from  profit  maximization 
under  uncertainty  with  respect  to  demand.4 
Here  we  want  to  emphasize  that  a  lack  of  effective  demand 
may  force  firms  to  reduce  their  production  capabilities  or  to  close 
down  in  case  of  bankruptcy.  Hudson  (1988)  provides  empirical  evi- 
dence  of  the  association  between  company  failures  and  the  business 
cycle.  It  should  be  noted  that  bankruptcies  are  not  possible  in  the 
neoclassical  model  in  which  the  Modigliani-Miller  theorem  holds. 
However,  the  real  world  seems  more  like  a  model  which  allows  for 
equity  rationing  as  discussed  in  Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1987,  1988). 
In  this  model  with  circulating  capital,  firms  go  bankrupt  if  what 
they  promise  to  pay  exceeds  their  income  from  producing  com- 
modities.  With  fixed  capital  it  is  optimal  to  liquidate  an  insolvent 
firm  if  the  liquidation  value  exceeds  expected  net  discounted  rev- 
enue,  adjusted  to  exclude  any  revenue  in  excess  of  current  debts 
(Hudson  1988). 
Turning  to  the  labor  market,  we  assume  that  unions  and  firms 
bargain  over  wages.  Union  welfare  depends  on  both  the  level  of 
real  wages  and  the  employment  rate  (compare  Oswald  1985).  The 
result  of  the  bargaining  process  can  be  summarized  by  a  wage-set- 
4Malinvaud  (1989)  derives  two  conditions  for  (ex  ante)  profit  maximization:  (1) 
the  capital  cost  of  a  unit  of  capacity  must  be  covered  exactly  by  the  expected  value 
of  the  (marginal)  gross  profit;  (2)  th  e  ( ex  ante)  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between 
capital  and  labor,  corrected  for  the  expected  rate  of  capacity  utilization,  should  be 
equal  to  the  factor  price  ratio.  These  two  conditions  determine  the  desired  capital 
stock.  An  investment  equation  could  be  derived  in  the  usual  way  by  assuming  that 
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ting  equation,  showing  that  the  final  level  of  real  wages  will  depend 
on  the  variables  in  the  firm’s  labor  demand  function,  the  employ- 
ment  rate,  and  proxies  for  relative  bargaining  strength  (for  example, 
Layard  and  Nickel1  1986).  Here  we  adopt  a  simplified  version  of 
this  equation,  which  gives  the  long-run  labor  supply  as 
where  S  denotes  the  labor  force,  and  R  denotes  the  target  real 
wage  rate.  The  extreme  case  of  a  completely  rigid  long-run  real 
wage  corresponds  to  y  =  0.  Full  labor  market  clearing  obtains  if  8 
=  0.  In  accordance  with  empirical  investigations  it  will  be  assumed 
that  the  time  path  of  real  wages  corresponds  to  an  error-correction 
mechanism  of  the  type  estimated  by  Sargan  (1964): 
(7) 
The  model  has  three  state  variables:  K,  P,  and  W.  Performing 
the  appropriate  substitutions,  the  dynamic  system  can  be  summa- 
rized  by  the  following  three  equations: 
p=p;~  y;  (  ) 
A 
- PP,  CW 
,=,,,,+,[(~)l’A~-l]w.  (8c) 
The  implications  of  the  model  may  be  sketched  by  discussing  the 
effects  of  a demand  shock.  A  more  formal  analysis  will  be  presented 
in  the  next  section.  Suppose  that  there  is  a  long-run  equilibrium 
initially.  The  long-run  equilibrium  is attained  at  point  F  on  the  iso- 
quant  I0  in  Figure  1.  The  labor  market  is  in  equilibrium,  N  =  S, 
so  that  the  real  wage  rate  equals  its  aspiration  level,  Ln.  A  decline 
in  the  parameter  A  shifts  the  isoquant  downward  to  II.  On  impact 
of  the  shock,  firms  operate  at  point  G  (for  a given  P),  laying  off  all 
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Figure  1. 
the  labor  they  do  not  need  to  produce  the  reduced  level  of  output. 
The  dynamics  of  the  model  induce  a  movement  as  shown  by  the 
arrow  starting  from  point  G.  Excess  capacity  forces  firms  to  lower 
prices,  while  in  the  meantime,  some  firms  may  have  to  close  down 
because  they  become  insolvent.  Real  wages  fall  as there  is an  excess 
supply  of  labor,  and  aspirations  can  no  longer  be  realized.  In  the 
long  run  (with  R =  P =  W  =  0,  and  Q  =  1)  the  economy  might 
settle  at  a  new  steady-state  equilibrium,  indicated  by  point  H  on 
the  isoquant  Z2 in  Figure  1.  Unemployment  appears  to  be  an  equi- 
librium  phenomenon  resulting  from  a  negative  aggregate  demand 
shock.  There  could  of  course  be  full  employment  if,  given  sufficient 
substitution  possibilities,  real  wages  decline  by  the  right  amount. 
As  observed  before,  setting  0  =  0  in  Equation  (8~)  would  do  the 
job.  However,  labor  unions  will  trade  off  a  lower  level  of  employ- 
ment  against  a  lower  level  of  real  wages  in  case  of  an  adverse  de- 
mand  shock. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  model  exhibits  hysteresis.  To  make 
this  more  lucid  let  us  assume  for  the  time  being  that  W  is  constant 
and  consider  the  dynamics  implied  by  Equations  (Sa)  and  (8b).  As 
appears  from  these  equations,  the  two  loci  E = 0 and  P  =  0  are 
identical  and  equal. 
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The  corresponding  phase  diagram  is  given  in  Figure  2.  Inspection 
of  the  differential  equations  shows  that  the  system  is  stable,  but 
the  long-run  equilibrium  depends  on  the  initial  position  of  both 
variables.  The  implications  of  hysteresis  for  employment  and  un- 
employment  in  the  long  run  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
In  that  section  the  log-linear  version  of  the  model  will  be  used  to 
present  a  formal  solution  of  the  dynamic  system. 
3.  Hysteresis  and  Unemployment 
The  model  given  in  Equations  (l)-(7)  can  easily  be  trans- 
formed  into  its  log-linear  equivalent.  The  logarithm  of  a  variable  is 
denoted  by  a  small  letter.  Coefficients  are  evaluated  at  an  initial 
steady  state  with  N  =  S and  W  =  K4. Ignoring  irrelevant  constants 
(including  the  user  cost  of  capital)  the  linearized  model  is  given  by 
/c =  a(a  -  k  -  p  +  hw)  , 
fi  =  p(a  -  k -  p  +  hw)  ,  (W 
Figure  2. 
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ti=e(o-w)+$a-(1-h)k-p]-ys., 
y=k-hw,  (94 
l=k-w,  (94 
n  = t  [a  -  (1 -  A) k -  p]  ,  w 
x=a-p.  &is) 
It  is  convenient  to  rewrite  the  dynamic  system  in  matrix  form.  -a -a  ah 
-P  -P  PA 
-y(l  -  A)/A  -y/A  -6 
Determination  of  the  characteristic  equation  of  the  state  matrix  on 
the  RHS  of  (10)  yields 
CT3  + (a  +  p  +  e) u2 +  {(a  +  p)O + $a(1  -  A) +  R]}  u  = 0  , 
The  roots  of  the  system  are  therefore  equal  to 
and 
u2.3  = 
-(a  + p + e)*  V(a  + p  + e)" -  4{(a  + p)e + $a(1  -  A) + P-J}  < o. 
2 
The  model  has  a  zero  root,  reflecting  hysteresis  implied  by  Equa- 
tions  (9a)  and  (9b)  and  two  negative  roots,  which  are  stabilizing.  As 
shown  in  Giavazzi  and  Wyplosz  (1985),  singularity  of  the  state  ma- 
trix  does  not  mean  that  the  model  is  indeterminate.  On  the  con- 
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trary,  for  any  set  of  initial  conditions  there  exists  a  unique  station- 
ary  equilibrium.  Here  we  proceed  as  follows.  The  dynamic  system 
(10)  can  be  simplified  by  noting  that  the  first  two  differential  equa- 
tions  generate  a  fixed  ratio  between  k  and  p  as  a  result  of  a  shock 
in  the  exogenous  variables.  This  can  best  be  seen  by  considering  a 
demand  shock.  A  change  in  the  exogenous  variable  a  leads  on  im- 
pact  to  a  change  in  k/p  of  magnitude  o/R.  The  dynamic  process 
following  such  a  shock  conserves  the  ratio  k/p  =  o/R  as  appears 
upon  inspection  of  the  state  matrix.  Therefore,  one  of  the  first  two 
differential  equations  can  be  replaced  by  the  equation5 
p=‘k+p,-fk,,  ci  (11) 
where  p,  and  k,  are  the  initial  values  of  p  and  k,  respectively. 
Elimination  of  Equation  (9b)  and  substitution  of  (11)  give  a 
reduced  dynamic  system  in  the  capital  stock  and  real  wages. 
aX  k  I[1  -e  w 
+[ri  E  :  qr-Tk].  (12) 
As  can  be  easily  checked,  the  roots  of  the  state  matrix  on  the  RHS 
of  (12)  are  equal  to  uz  and  cr3 given  above.  As  a  result  the  dynamic 
system  presented  in  (12)  is  stable.  The  rest  point  may  be  a  stable 
5This  procedure  of  eliminating  the  zero  root  can  be  generalized  as  zero  roots 
reflect  dependency  of  rows  and  columns  in  the  state  matrix.  Now,  the  system  of 
equations  Ax  =  b,  where  the  matrix  A  is  of  order  n  X  n  and  of  rank  r,  has  a 
solution  if  the  augmented  matrix  B  =  [Alb]  is  also  of  rank  r.  The  solution  is  ob- 
tained  from  r  equations,  and  the  remaining  (n  -  r)  equations  can  be  ignored  as 
derivable  from  them.  The  latter  can  be  called  surplus  equations  (for  example,  Allen 
1956).  The  solution  expresses  r  variables  in  terms  of  the  (n  -  r)  surplus  variables. 
Substitution  of  the  solution  in  the  original  system  gives  a  reduced  system  with  a 
nonsingular  matrix.  Application  to  a  system  of  differential  equations  yields  a  state 
matrix  with  non-zero  roots,  which  can  be  handled  in  the  usual  way. 
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node  or  the  focus  of  a  spiral  if  the  roots  are  conjugate  complex. 
This  result  corresponds  in  a  qualitative  sense  with  the  outcome  of 
the  dynamic  neoclassical  model  of  Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985,  chap.  3). 
The  long-run  or  steady  state  solution  implying  k  =  zi,  =  0  can  be 
found  from 
Solving  Equation  (13)  yields 
w*=~[-ay(p,-%k,)+uya+(a+B)(Bw-ys)],  (14b) 
where  the  determinant  of  the  state  matrix  A  =  ((Y  +  B)CI 
+  $c~(l  -  h)  +  B]  is  positive.  From  Equations  (11)  and  (14a)  the 
long-run  solution  of  p  can  be  determined  as 
+ (y + 0)a  + x(eo -  YS)  .  (14c) 
The  solutions  for  the  other  endogenous  variables  can  now  be  found 
by  substituting  (14a),  (14b),  and  (14c),  in  (9d),  (se),  (9f),  and  (9g). 
The  results  are 
y*  =  x*  =  ; 
{ 
-a[o-h)r+el(Po-$ko) 
+ CX[(l -  A)y  +  e]d  -  pA(e0  -  ys)  ,  (144 
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l*=n*=i{-oB(p.-!k,) 
+ c&a  -  [(l  -  A)a  +  8](f3w  -  ys) 
I 
.  (144 
The  long-run  solutions  give  rise  to  a  number  of  interesting 
observations: 
(a)  The  results  show  what  hysteresis  in  this  model  means:  the 
long-run  outcomes  of  all  the  endogenous  variables  depend  on  the 
initial  conditions  of  the  state  variables  p  and  k  and  on  the  approach 
path,  so  that  the  parameters  which  determine  the  dynamics  of  ad- 
justment  have  a  permanent  effect  on  the  economy  (compare  Gia- 
vazzi  and  Wyplosz  1985).  It  should  be  noted  that  we  only  consider 
constant  values  of  the  exogenous  variables.  If  these  variables  are 
time-dependent,  the  solutions  are  more  complex  and  depend  on  the 
entire  sequence  of  exogenous  shocks  (compare  Buiter  1986). 
(b)  An  adverse  demand  shock  (Aa  <  0)  leads  to  a  reduction 
in  the  stock  of  capital  and  a  reduction  in  prices  depending  on  the 
relative  size  of  the  relevant  speed  of  adjustment.  This  is  most  clearly 
seen  in  the  special  case  that  y  =  0  (no  Phillips  curve  effect).  We 
then  have  Aw*  = 0,  Ak*  =  [cx/(a  +  P)]Aa,  and  Ap*  =  [8/(o  +  P)]Aa. 
A  relatively  high  value  of  the  “accelerator,”  CX,  compared  with  the 
measure  of  price  flexibility,  8,  leads  to  a relatively  large  capital  de- 
cumulation  while  prices  are  much  less  affected.  This  looks  plausi- 
ble.  If  prices  do  not  adjust  fast,  profitability  will  not  be  restored 
quickly  and  a  larger  number  of  firms  will  face  bankruptcy.  In  the 
case  of  price  rigidity  8  =  0,  there  is  a  one-to-one  correspondence 
between  the  demand  shock  and  the  decline  in  the  capital  stock.  If 
prices  are  fully  flexible,  8  +  CQ,  the  capital  stock,  does  not  change 
at  all,  and  there  is  an  exact  correspondence  between  a  demand  shock 
and  the  resulting  price  level.  As  can  be  seen,  a  negative  demand 
shock  gives  rise  to  unemployment  unless  the  labor  market  clears  in 
the  long  run  (9  =  0,  y  >  0). 
(c)  A negative  supply  shock  (Aw  >  0  or  As <  0)  induces  a  rise 
in  real  wages.  The  long-run  demand  curve  for  labor  therefore  has 
a  negative  slope.  Rising  real  wages  go  along  with  an  increase  in  the 
capital  stock  and  a  fall  in  employment.  The  fall  in  employment  is 
the  outcome  of  opposing  forces.  The  positive  capacity  effect  (via  k) 
of  a  rise  in  w  or  a  decline  in  s  is  smaller  than  the  negative  sub- 
stitution  effect  (via  I),  with  the  result  that  y  decreases.  From  a  pol- 
icy  point  of  view  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  a  decline  in  employ- 
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ment  in  case  of  a  negative  supply  shock  can  be  prevented  by  a 
positive  demand  shock  of  sufficient  strength.  However,  there  may 
be  a  caveat  here.  From  the  mathematical  point  of  view  the  model 
can  be  applied  symmetrically.  Positive  and  negative  shocks  exhibit 
the  same  quantitative  effects  in  absolute  terms.  In  reality  there  may 
be  some  asymmetry  as  speeds  of  adjustment  differ  in  both  situa- 
tions.  In  severe  recessions,  OL  may  be  relatively  large,  whereas  in 
booms,  p  may  be  relatively  large.  During  downturns,  bankruptcies 
lead  to  selling  out  assets  and  an  immediate  loss of  firm-  or  industry- 
specific  physical  capital.  In  contrast,  during  upturns  investment  in 
new  capacity  may  take  more  time.  For  instance,  the  problem  many 
European  countries  have  faced  in  recent  years  is  how  the  supply 
side  of  the  economy  can  cope  with  an  expansion  in  demand  when 
its  capacity  has  been  reduced  by  previous  demand  shocks  resulting 
in  capital  scrapping. 
(d)  Anti-cyclical  economic  policy  may  not  only  take  the  form 
of  stabilizing  demand  but  may  also  be  aimed  at  a  reduction  of  the 
parameter,  (Y, in  recessions.  Retaining  supply-side  capacity  is  the 
main  theme  of  Hudson  (1988)  in  his  thought-provoking  contribution 
to  the  theory  of  the  trade  cycle.  Whether  this  is  a  feasible  policy 
remains  to  be  seen,  as  it  requires  empirical  evidence  which  is  not 
readily  available.  Moreover,  there  is  the  question  of  whether  the 
political  system  can  handle  it. 
4.  Conclusion 
As  indicated  in  the  first  section,  empirical  evidence  gives  sup- 
port  to  a  capital  shortage  interpretation  of  European  unemploy- 
ment,  which  during  the  recessions  of  1974-1975  and  1980-1982  in- 
creased  by  two  substantial  jumps.  This  paper  has  sought  to  explore 
how  capital  decumulation  might  arise  as  a  consequence  of  adverse 
demand  shocks.  The  neoclassical  model  does  not  predict  such  a  re- 
lationship,  not  even  when  monopolistic  competition  is  taken  into 
account.  To  cope  with  the  problem,  we  therefore  have  to  resort  to 
the  assumption  that  the  market  for  commodities  exhibits  price  in- 
ertia.  In  such  a  Keynesian  model  quantity  adjustments  (of  output 
and  capacity)  are  of  central  importance.  The  labor  market  is  mod- 
eled  by  assuming  that  unions  and  firms  negotiate  over  real  wages. 
The  implications  of  the  model  are  sketched  by  discussing  the 
effects  of  a  negative  demand  shock.  The  model  exhibits  hysteresis: 
a  demand  shock  leads  to  a  reduction  in  the  stock  of  capital,  which 
is not  restored  by  the  reduction  in  prices  unless  in  the  limiting  (and 
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unrealistic)  case  that  prices  are  assumed  to  be  fully  flexible.  As  a 
result,  an  adverse  demand  shock  gives  rise  to  unemployment,  un- 
less  unions  are  absent  and  the  labor  market  clears.  If  so,  full  em- 
ployment  may  be  possible,  but  capital  and  output  will  not  return 
to  their  initial  positions. 
The  present  analysis  can  be  extended  in  different  directions. 
Insider  effects  and  outsider  effects  (compare  Layard  and  Bean  1988) 
may  provide  forms  of  hysteresis,  which  can  be  combined  with  state 
dependency  of  the  capital  stock.  Moreover,  the  idea  of  fragile  equi- 
libria  (compare  Summers  1988)  may  be  fruitful  in  analyzing  firm 
behavior  along  the  lines  set  in  this  paper. 
Received:  January  1989 
Final  version:  October  1989 
References 
Allen,  Roy  G.D.  Mathematical  Economics.  London:  MacMillan,  1956. 
Arrow,  Kenneth.  “Towards  a  Theory  of  Price  Adjustment.”  In  The 
Allocation  of  Economic  Resources,  edited  by  M.  Abramovitz,  41- 
51.  Stanford:  Stanford  University,  1959. 
Ball,  Lawrence,  and  David  Romer.  “Sticky  Prices  as  Coordination 
Failure.”  NBER  Working  Paper  No.  2327,  Cambridge,  1987. 
Benassy,  Jean-Pascal.  The  Economics  of  Market  Disequilibrium.  Or- 
lando:  Academic  Press,  Inc.,  1982. 
Blanchard,  Olivier  J.,  and  Lawrence  H.  Summers.  “Hysteresis  and 
the  European  Unemployment  Problem.”  In  NBER  Macroeco- 
rwmics  Annual  1986,  edited  by  S.  Fisher.  Cambridge:  MIT  Press, 
1986. 
Blanchard,  Olivier  J.,  and  Nobuhiro  Kiyotaki.  “Monopolistic  Com- 
petition  and  the  Effects  of  Aggregate  Demand.”  American  Eco- 
nomic  Review  77  (1987):  647-66. 
Blanchard,  Olivier  J.  “Unemployment:  Getting  the  Questions  Right 
and  Some  of  the  Answers.”  NBER  Working  Paper  No.  2698, 
Cambridge,  1988. 
Bruno,  Michael,  and  Jeffrey  D.  Sachs.  Economics  of  Worldwide 
Stagflation.  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1985. 
Buiter,  Willem  H.  “Policy  Evaluation  and  Design  for  Continuous 
Time  Linear  Rational  Expectations  Models:  Some  Recent  De- 
velopments.”  In  Prices,  Competition  and  Equilibrium,  edited  by 
M.H.  Peston  and  R.E.  Quandt,  84-108.  Oxford:  Philip  Allan 
Publishers,  1986. 
378 Unemployment  Persistence  and  Loss  of  Productive  Capacity 
Burda,  Michael  C.  “Is  There  a  Capital  Shortage  in  Europe.”  Welt- 
wirtschaftliches  Archiv  124  (1988):  38-57. 
Giavazzi,  Francesco,  and  Charles  Wyplosz.  “The  Zero  Root  Prob- 
lem:  A  Note  on  the  Dynamic  Determination  of  the  Stationary 
Equilibrium  in  Linear  Models.”  Review  of  Economic  Studies  52 
(1985):  353-57. 
Greenwald,  Bruce  C,  and  Joseph  E.  Stiglitz.  “Imperfect  Informa- 
tion,  Credit  Markets  and  Unemployment.”  European  Economic 
Review  31  (1987):  444-56. 
-.  “Financial  Market  Imperfections  and  Business  Cycles.” 
NBER  Working  Paper  No.  2494,  Cambridge,  1988. 
Hall,  Robert  E.,  and  John  B.  Taylor.  Macroeconomics:  Theory,  Per- 
formance  and  Policy.  New  York:  W. W.  Norton  and  Company, 
1988. 
Hudson,  John.  Unemployment  After  Keynes:  Towards  a  New  Gen- 
eral  Theory.  Hertfordshire:  Harvester-Wheatsleaf,  1988. 
Klundert,  Theo  van  de,  and  Pieter  Peters.  “Price  Inertia  in  a  Ma- 
cro-economic  Model  of  Monopolistic  Competition.”  Economica 
55  (1988):  203-17. 
Layard,  Richard,  and  Stephen  J.  Nickell.  “Unemployment  in  Brit- 
ain.”  Economica  53  (1986):  SIZl-S169. 
Layard,  Richard,  and  Charles  R.  Bean.  “Why  Does  Unemployment 
Persist?”  Discussion  Paper  No.  321,  Center  for  Labor  Econom- 
ics,  London  School  of  Economics,  1988. 
Malinvaud,  Edmond.  The  Theory  of  Unemployment  Reconsidered. 
Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell,  1977. 
-.  Profitability  and  Unemployment.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1980. 
-.  “Profitability  and  Factor  Demands  under  Uncertainty.”  De 
Economist  137  (1989):  2-I5. 
Nickell,  Steven  J.  “Why  is Wage  Inflation  in  Britain  so  High?’  Or- 
ford  Bulletin  of  Economics  and  Statistics  49  (1987):  103-28. 
Oswald,  Andrew  J.  “The  Economic  Theory  of  Trade  Unions:  An 
Introductory  Survey.”  Scandinavian  Journal  of  Economics  87 
(1985):  160-92. 
Ploeg,  Frederick  van  der.  “Trade  Unions,  Investment,  and  Em- 
ployment:  A Noncooperative  Approach.”  European  Economic  Re- 
view  39  (1987):  1465-92. 
Sachs,  Jeffrey  D.  “High  Unemployment  in  Europe:  Diagnosis  and 
Policy  Implications.  ”  In  Unemployment  in  Europe:  Analysis  and 
Policy  Issues,  edited  by  Claes-Henric  Siven.  Stockholm:  Timbro, 
1987. 
379 Theo  C.M.].  van  de  Klundert  and  Anton  B.T.M.  van  Schaik 
Sargan,  J.D.  “Wages  and  Prices  in  the  U.K.”  In  Econometric  Anal- 
ysis  for  National  Economic  Planning,  edited  by  P.E.  Hart,  G. 
Mills,  and  J.K.  Whittaker.  London:  Butterworths,  1964. 
Stiglitz,  Joseph  E.  “Price  Rigidities  and  Market  Structure.”  Amer- 
ican  Economic  Review  74  (1984):  350-55. 
Summers,  Lawrence  H.  “Should  Keynesian  Economics  Dispense 
with  the  Phillips  Curve?’  In  Unemployment,  Hysteresis  and  the 
Natural  Rate  Hypothesis,  edited  by  Rod  Cross,  11-25.  Oxford: 
Basil  Blackwell,  1988. 
Appendix 
List  of  notation 
The  logarithm  of  a  variable  is  denoted  by  a  small  letter. 
A,  a  =  parameter  demand. 
K,  k  =  stock  of  capital. 
L,  1 =  notional  labor  demand. 
N,  n  =  actual  employment. 
P,  p  =  price  level. 
Q  =  rate  of  capacity  utilization. 
R  =  real  user  cost  of  capital. 
S,  s =  supply  of  labor. 
W,  w  =  real  wage  rate. 
X,  x =  actual  output. 
Y,  y  = potential  output. 
a  =  speed  of  adjustment  investment. 
B =  speed  of  adjustment  prices. 
y  =  speed  of  adj ustment  real  wages. 
E = parameter  production  function. 
A = production  elasticity. 
8  = parameter  labor  supply 
,R,  w  = target  real  wage  rate. 
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